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Given the importance of banking intermediation, we investigate the determinants of 
the size of bank loans in 18 OECD countries in the period 1981-1997. The aim of the paper 
is to show that the ratio of government debt to GDP has a negative effect on the level of 
bank credit. Second, countries with a German legal origin have higher ratios of loans to 
GDP than common law countries. Our results are robust to including such variables in the 
regressions as per capita GDP, stock market capitalization, the banking reserve requirement, 
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Banks are a key element of financial structures all over the world, contributing to the 
financing of the economy and the management of the payment system. But why are banks 
more important in some countries and less so in others? In 2004 the ratio of loans to GDP was 
around 46 per cent in the US, 77 per cent in France and 100 per cent  in Germany. The ratio of 
deposits to GDP was 40 per cent in the US, 68 per cent in France and 86 per cent in Spain. 
Different strands of literature studied how the level of bank loans is influenced by 
economic and institutional variables. Since the 1960s the financial repression approach 
rationalized the restrictions that affected the financial systems of industrialized countries 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). These studies refer to policy instruments – such as high 
reserve requirement, implicit taxes levied through inflation, explicit taxation, issues of 
government bonds – that might reduce the size of banking systems. On the contrary, path 
dependency theories of financial development stress the role of legal origin as the central 
factor driving the cross-country differences we observe today (La Porta et al, 1997). The idea 
that legal origin is the major force explaining financial structures has been criticized as being 
excessively mechanistic. Financial systems change because of the evolution of the real 
economies and new political choices. For example Rajan and Zingales (2003) showed how 
financial markets in civil law countries were reversed throughout the last century and start to 
recover only at the end of the 1980s. Other authors state antagonism between banks and stock 
markets. This is a very old argument whereas other studies postulate a positive nexus between 
banks and equity markets. 
The goal of this paper is to present new evidence on the determinants of bank loans in 
OECD countries, discriminating between the different factors by placing them in a general 
empirical model. The issue we address has not only a theoretical but also a policy relevance. 
If factors that limit bank development are detected, political authorities may introduce reforms 
to foster bank credit, whose link with economic growth has been established by many 
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contributions. As far as we know, our new insight is the negative effect of government debt 
on bank loans. 
While most of the literature concentrates on cross-sections, we present a panel analysis 
of the main OECD countries in the period 1981-1997. Cross-sections for large samples of 
heterogeneous countries run the risk of not taking into account unobservable factors that may 
influence the results. Developed countries are more homogeneous and therefore easier to 
compare. 
The paper is divided into 6 sections: the following Section 2 reviews the literature; 
Section 3 presents the data and introduces some stylized facts; Section 4 illustrates the 
empirical specification and comments on the econometric exercises; Section 5 contains some 
robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A review of the literature 
Our paper is connected to various strands of the literature. A first link is with the theory 
of financial repression. This approach emphasizes a supply side aspect of financial 
development: governments may repress the size of the financial and banking sectors to raise 
revenues from alternative channels that lie under their control. Financial repression artificially 
increases the private sector’s demand for those assets that are the basis of implicit taxes, e.g. 
the monetary base and the public debt. By the second half of the 1960s, regulations, taxes, 
qualitative and quantitative controls, often introduced to pursue monetary policy goals, made 
it difficult for financial intermediaries to fulfil their technological potential (Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995). These measures shrank the financial systems of many countries (Battilossi, 
2003). Here we review some of the contributions on these subjects. 
Following Fisher’s ideas on debt deflation, Boyd et al (2001) assess that inflation causes 
lower rates of return on loans, thus leading to reduced credit. Smaller real returns can not only 
decrease the availability of financing but also draw lower quality borrowers into the pool of 
credit seekers. The authors find a negative relationship between inflation and banking sector 
size. 
There are links between inflation, reserve requirement and government bonds. Brock 
(1989) considers not only the inflation tax levied on currency but also that on banks’ non-
interest bearing reserves. In addition, regulation of banks’ portfolio composition is a 
complementary instrument of financial repression. The government may impose portfolio 
constraints by setting public debt securities as the only assets eligible for meeting banks’ 





government bonds. Further, the government may impose credit ceilings as demonstrated by 
many industrialized countries in the 1970s. Giovannini and De Melo (1991) explain how 
nominal interest rate ceilings combined with controls on international flows may generate an 
artificially low cost of domestic funding for the government and consequent revenues from 
financial repression. However the link between fiscal policy and banking is not entirely clear. 
Studying the Italian case, Piluso and Ricciuti (2008) find evidence of  pro-cyclical behaviour 
as regards public spending, taxes and bank variables, even if the causal connections are not 
investigated.  
Our paper also looks at the law and finance view. This approach emphasizes the idea 
that early institutions and arrangements persist over time and determine current outcomes. 
The mechanism rests on two points: on the one hand, the basis of finance is the protection of 
investor and creditor rights; on the other hand, the legal origin of countries is the source of 
this basis. Legal systems are classified into four categories of origin: Anglo-Saxon, French, 
German and Scandinavian. They emerged in previous centuries, spreading abroad through 
conquest and imitation and can explain the differences in investor protection, contracting 
environment and financial development that countries exhibit today. La Porta et al (1997) 
show that countries with higher shareholders rights and common law traditions, by and large 
nations of Anglo-Saxon legal origin, have relatively larger financial markets. The legal 
approach has been criticized because it overlooks structural breaks in history. Beck et al 
(2003a) compared the legal traditions paradigm with the "adaptability channel of law": the 
authors find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ 
in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. They conclude that in 
terms of adaptability the German system is closer to the common law than the French legal 
system. We will come back to this issue of the nature of the German legal system later on. 
Other scholars criticized the legal origin approach, underlining the role of interest 
groups changing over time in explaining cross-country differences in financial systems. Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) say that preferences of influential interest groups were implemented 
through the last century by the choice of opening to trade: they show how both in 1913 and in 
1997, for any level given of demand, financial development was higher in countries that were 
more open to trade.
2 The idea is that international competition weakens the incumbents’ 
opposition to financial development. Quy-Toan Do and Levchenko (2004) provide empirical 
evidence that trade openness affects the financial systems of countries in a non linear way: 
                                                           
2 Alcalà and Ciccone (2003) show how trade openness was a robust determinant of economic growth in the 





among developed countries trade promotes financial systems while it has an opposite effect 
among the poorer ones. Chinn and Ito (2006) focus on the effects of capital account 
liberalization on financial growth and conclude that financial openness matters only when a 
threshold level of legal and institutional development has been attained. 
In Section 3 we present our empirical strategy.  
 
3. The data and some stylized facts 
We examine the effects of forms of financial repression and legal origin on bank loans, 
controlling for stock market capitalization, per capita income and other indicators. We use 
both contemporaneous variables (such as the reserve requirement and public debt), lagged 
variables (such as per capita GDP) and time-invariant variables (such as legal origin) referred 
to 18 OECD countries. The analysis is based upon data originally recorded at an annual 
frequency, over the period 1981-1997. We chose this time interval because the first 
composition of the euro area was defined in 1998 and this institutional break might have 
affected both the behaviour of private credit and its statistical definition.
3 
With regard to our dependent variable, we use the definition adopted by Levine and 
Zervos (1998) and Levine et al (2000), i.e. the credit granted by the banking system to the 
private sector, relative to GDP. 
Moving to the independent variables, financial repression is measured through different 
indicators. The reserve requirement is proxied by the ratio of a bank’s liquid reserves to its 
assets. Inflation rates are measured as annual growth rates of the consumer price index.   
Inflation volatility, measured by the annual standard deviation of the monthly inflation rate, 
might also affect credit. Public debt is measured by the gross general government debt as a 
percentage of GDP. It is difficult to collect statistics on other financial repression instruments, 
such as quantitative ceilings or controls on deposit and lending rates. Moreover most of these 
measures were gradually suppressed in OECD countries in the 1980s.  
Legal origin is considered using the dummies introduced by La Porta et al (1997). The 
same source was exploited to assess the level of creditor rights protection. Trade openness is 
measured with the index suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003), i.e. the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. 
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According to a large, though still controversial, body of literature, there is a link between 
economic growth and finance. While the direction of causality is difficult to establish, the 
predominant empirical finding is that financial development causes economic growth (for a 
survey, see Levine, 2003). There is also an opposing view that was probably initiated by Joan 
Robinson’s claim that “finance follows”. In this interpretation the structure of the economy 
determines the types of intermediaries that are best suited to industrial firms. Allen et al (2006) 
show that financial institutions and markets develop in response to the needs of firms and the 
characteristics of the real economy. We take this debate into account by using per capita GDP 
as a proxy of the demand side schedule which might influence the equilibrium level of bank 
credit. Per capita income is measured in terms of purchasing power parity.  
Finally, other studies look at financial systems emphasizing the differences between 
bank-based and market-based countries. This approach implies that banks and markets are 
substitutes: households may prefer to invest in deposits rather than in shares; firms may 
favour shares over bank loans. In a different perspective, stock market capitalization may 
promote banking activity if banks and markets play a complementary role (Levine and 
Zervos, 1998). In this view both intermediaries and markets matter for growth (see Demirgüç 
-Kunt and Levine, 2001, for a synthesis). Given the existence of different opinions, we control 
how stock market capitalization, as a share of GDP, is linked to banking intermediation.  
Table 1 reports the data definition and the sources of the statistics, while Table 2 lists 
the countries we selected, mainly on the basis of the available long term time series. Table 3 
presents some descriptive statistics. Over all periods and all countries, the average ratios of 
loans to GDP is 0.71. As indicated by minimum and maximum values, there are marked 
differences across countries and years for both bank loans and explanatory variables. 
 






















































































Figure 1 shows the link between countries’ private credit and legal traditions. Banking 
development is substantially greater in the German origin group than in countries with an 
Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Further, all Scandinavian countries are located below the average 
size. This evidence is confirmed by the correlation matrix (Table 4), which shows a positive 
association between banking development and countries belonging to the German legal 
tradition while a negative correlation is detected for Scandinavian countries. The matrix also 
shows a negative correlation between government debt and the size of bank loans. Negative 
linkages are observed for bank credit and either inflation rates or reserve requirement. Further, 
there is a positive association between bank credit, on the one hand, and both stock market 
capitalization and per capita income, on the other. 
In the following section we turn to multivariate regressions. 
 
4. The empirical specification and the econometric results 
 
4.1 The empirical model 
The panel nature of the dataset is exploited through a static model specified as: 
t i priv    =  α  +   X t i β  +  η i + ε t i  
where  t i priv  are loans to the private sector, the vector  X t i  contains time-varying 
determinants (such as financial repression instruments, per capita GDP and stock market 
capitalization) while the term η i captures “path dependency” time-invariant country 
components. 
We followed the standard practice of taking five-year averages to remove the effects of 
the business cycle from the analysis (see Islam, 1995). As a further control, we estimated our 
models over the original annual database (see paragraph 5.1). To avoid the endogeneity issues 
associated with reverse causality between banking activity, on the one hand, and per capita 
income and stock market capitalization, on the other, we specified those explanatory variables 
also through lagged terms.
4 In such a way they are predetermined with respect to the 
dependent variable.  
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Cross-country heterogeneity - not captured by financial repression time-varying 
components - was taken into account through legal origin dummy variables, the first 
difference estimator, or by estimating both random and fixed effect models
5. 
 
4.2 Determinants of the ratio of bank loans to GDP  
In studying the determinants of the credit granted by the banking system to the private 
sector, as a share of GDP, we follow a step-by-step procedure, starting from a simple model 
and then adding new variables. Overall we present seven different regressions (Table 5). 
Beginning with the financial repression variables, the inflation rate sometimes has a negative 
impact on banking loans, but the coefficients are never significant. Moreover the volatility of 
inflation does not affect the ratio of credit to GDP. The coefficient of the reserve requirement 
has a negative sign but it is significant only in two regressions. We cannot support the results 
of Haslagh and Koo (1999) that the reserve requirement has a negative impact on banking 
business. 
On the contrary, government debt has a negative and statistically significant influence 
on the ratio of loans to GDP. A 10 per cent increase in the government debt to GDP ratio is 
expected to lower credit granted to private sectors by 3 (regression 2) or 5 (regression 7) 
percentage points, respectively. Our result might reflect two similar and interdependent 
phenomena. According to the public finance approach to financial repression (Giovannini and 
De Melo, 1991; Battilossi,  2003; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), issuing government 
securities is a way for the State to collect revenues, especially when the proceeds from legal 
taxation are difficult or costly to obtain, and banks find government securities a good 
investment. The second interpretation is a typical crowding out effect: in countries where the 
government has a large involvement in the economy, greater shares of bank credit may flow 
to State-owned firms, reducing the loans to the private sector. Our results are consistent with 
those obtained by Hauner (2008), who finds a negative link between public debt held by 
banks and financial development in middle-income countries. 
While the financial repression literature brings into prominence the distortions that 
affected the banking systems since the 1960s, the legal origin theory emphasizes an older 
historical derivation of financial systems. Our exercises show that a share of cross-country 
variability is captured by the legal origin components. The significance of the legal origin 
variables is seen both in regression 6 (where individual random components are allowed) and 
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in regression 7 (where legal origin captures all the variability not accounted for by time-
varying determinants). Countries based on German or French law have greater ratios of loans 
to GDP than common law countries. The German origin effect is the strongest. German origin 
countries have around 50 percentage points higher ratios of private credit to GDP with respect 
to the common law countries, while French origin countries have around 30 percentage points 
greater ratios of loans to GDP with respect to the common law countries. The role of legal 
origin in influencing capital market development has been recognized by Beck et al (2003a), 
even if associated with countries’ initial endowments. While La Porta et al (1997) state that 
common law countries are more favourable to financial development, we find that German 
and French laws lead to higher ratios of loans to GDP. This conundrum is examined in 
paragraph 5.3. 
Moving on to the control variables, per capita income has a positive impact on the ratio 
of loans to GDP. This is true using contemporaneous per capita income (regression 2 and 4) 
while the coefficients are positive but not significant using lagged per capita income in fixed 
and random effect models (regressions 3 and 5). When legal origin dummies are added to the 
random effect model (regression 6), we obtain similar results.  
The econometric exercises of Table 5 also show that contemporaneous stock market 
capitalization has a positive but not statistically significant influence on the loans to GDP 
ratio, while predetermined stock market capitalization has a positive and significant 
coefficient in the random effect model (regression 5). Results are confirmed when legal origin 
dummies are added to the random effect and pooled models (regressions 6 and 7). This 
positive nexus confirms the hypothesis of complementarity between stock market 
capitalization and private credit highlighted in Levine and Zervos (1998). 
Now we turn to some robustness checks of our econometric exercises. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
5.1 Do annual data regressions replicate the five-year average statistics results?  
To increase the efficiency of our estimates, we run a further nine regressions by 
exploiting annual statistics (Table 6). We consider the same seven regressions of Table 5 plus 
two other exercises that include yearly time dummies. The estimated parameters confirm the 
previous results. Government debt maintains its negative and significant influence on the ratio 
of loans to GDP. A move from the sample mean of 62 per cent to a ratio of 52 per cent is 





increase in the loans to GDP ratio. Current inflation, its volatility, and the reserve requirement 
do not influence bank credit. The legal tradition confirms its role in explaining differences in 
the variability of banking business across countries: compared with common law countries, 
German and French legal origins are associated with higher ratios of loans to GDP. The 
German legal tradition dummy has the largest coefficients. Per capita GDP and stock market 
capitalization maintain a positive and often significant impact on the ratio of outstanding 
loans to GDP. 
 
5.2 Splitting the period into two sub-periods 
Banking deregulation and liberalization were much stronger in the 1990s than in the 
1980s. European directives liberalized banking markets but the same process also took place 
in other OECD countries such as the US.
6  There were also changes in inflation, the reserve 
requirement, government debt and capital account rules moving from the 1980s to the 1990s.  
For this reason we split our sample into two periods, 1981-1989 and 1990-1997 to search for 
possible breaks in the determinants of the ratio of credit to GDP. The results, given in Tables 
7 and 8, confirm our previous results. Government debt has a negative influence on private 
credit and the positive sign of German legal origin is confirmed. As expected, the effect of the 
government debt to GDP ratio is stronger when the analysis is carried out over the period 
1981-1989, as shown by the larger coefficients. In this period, countries which reduce the 
government debt to GDP ratio by 10 percentage points, are expected to raise credit to GDP 
ratio by 5.5 percentage points (see regressions 6 and 7) while for the period 1990-1997, the 
same decrease in government debt is associated with a rise in the dependent variable by  4 
percentage points. 
 
5.3 Creditor rights vs. legal origin  
In the previous paragraphs we found that the law and finance approach provides some 
insights to explain the size of bank loans in OECD countries. We now scrutinize this effect 
more closely, looking at the degree of protection of creditors as a determinant of banking 
development. In their aggregated indebtedness regressions over 39 countries, La Porta et al 
(1997) found significance for a creditor rights term. This indebtedness measure includes 
private sector bank debt and outstanding non-financial bonds. As in the previous paragraphs 
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we concentrate on the determinants of bank loans because firms’ bond issues respond to 
different motivations from the raising of bank credit (see paragraph 5.4 on firms’ securities 
issued). Djankov et al (2007) found that stronger legal rights for creditors are associated with 
a higher level of private credit, running cross-section regressions for a set of 129 countries. 
On this basis, we investigate the linkage between creditor rights and the ratio of loans to GDP 
in our sample of OECD countries. 
The creditor rights index has a positive effect on the ratio of bank loans to GDP (Table 
9) but significance is only obtained when the legal origin dummies are left out of the model, 
probably because of a positive correlation between creditor rights and the German legal origin 
dummy. The signs and the significance obtained in the previous paragraph for the other 
regressors also remain unchanged using five-year average statistics (the results are not given 
here).  
To sum up, we find that the German legal tradition leads to larger banking systems than 
the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian ones. Our conclusion is different from the typical results 
of the law and finance theory, which links the Anglo-Saxon legal origin to greater financial 
systems. La Porta et al (1997) stated that: 
 
“[…] indebtedness is even higher in the German civil law countries – also sometimes described with 
bank-focused financial systems. […] low rights line up with small markets when we compare French and 
English origin but German civil law countries are somewhat of a mystery.
7 
 
It is possible to reconcile our results with the law and finance view by observing that 
while we look at the determinants of bank credit, La Porta et al study the determinants of 
different notions of finance, i.e. stock market capitalization or bank loans plus bonds issued 
by firms. Our empirical results show that there is no German mystery: the German legal 
origin leads to more bank loans, which are an important source of external finance for firms. 
This evidence is compatible with Gerschenkron’s (1962) thesis on the importance of the 
universal banks, not the stock market, for the economic growth of Germany and the other 
countries where this model of intermediary has spread. 
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5.4 Do results survive if corporate bonds are included in the picture ? 
The size of bank loans might be influenced by firms’ bond issues. One might argue that 
bank credit is more important where firms’ securities issues are smaller (see Fink et al, 2005). 
To study the relevance of corporate bonds, we included in the model the ratio to GDP of 
bonds issued by non-financial corporations. For 13 OECD countries data on corporate bonds 
are available in a time-series format. The econometric exercise (Table 10) shows that the 
corporate securities coefficient is never significant. The introduction of firms’ bonds does not 
affect the previous determinants of the ratio of credit to GDP. 
 
5.5 Other robustness checks  
Here we discuss another four robustness checks of our regressions (for the sake of 
brevity the results are not given here but are available upon request). 
First, Perotti and Von Thadden (2005) argue that in many countries the middle classes 
experienced the post-World War I inflationary shocks and their wealth endowments were 
seriously damaged; by consequence these classes turned toward more protected bank-oriented 
systems. Therefore, one should find a positive link between past inflation and the current 
weight of banks. We built an indicator of the post-World War I inflationary shocks, by 
averaging the annual growth rates of the consumer price index over the period 1910-1950 in 
some countries where historical statistics are available (see Mitchell, 2003). Inflationary 
shocks are statistically significant when there are no other independent variables. When we 
introduce other regressors - such as government debt and legal origin – past inflationary 
shocks lose their power to explain the current ratio of loans to GDP. We were not able to find 
a positive link between past inflationary shocks and current banking business. 
Second, as seen in the review of the literature, some authors claim a positive connection 
between trade openness and banking development. Our results show that in most cases trade 
openness has a negative effect on bank loans but the coefficients are rarely statistically 
significant. Our findings do not support Rajan and Zingales’s (2003) or Quy-Toan Do and 
Levchenko’s (2004) views that there is positive linkage between trade and the size of 
financial systems. 
Third, in the last few years some scholars improved the measurement of  bank 
regulation and supervision indicators in order to understand national characteristics of 
banking business (see Barth et al, 2006). Exploiting a dataset created by the World Bank for 





such as entry barriers and competition regulation variables, restrictions on banking business, 
separation between banking and commerce, capital ratios, deposit insurance, official 
supervisory action variables, market discipline and transparency. This line of research is very 
interesting, but information on banking regulation and supervision is available in the form of 
cross-section statistics and refers only to very recent periods, while in this paper we study the 
development of banking loans over two decades. A harmonized picture of banking regulation 
is not available for the 1980s. For these reasons, the World Bank cross-section database is not 
used in our paper, even if we are aware that regulation is an important determinant of banking 
intermediation. Moreover, some variables used in the banking regulation approach, e.g. 
branching restrictions, are common to the financial repression theory. Pagano and Volpin 
(2001) claim that banking regulation is an example of where political factors are important, 
quoting the case of branching limits. Branching may be interpreted as an instrument to repress 
the geographical reach of banks. We use the ratio of branches to population in 1980 or 1985 
as a determinant of the ratio of credit to GDP; we consider the lagged values of branches to 
avoid endogeneity issues with the level of loans. In our regressions, banking branches in 1980 
(or 1985) are not significant to explain the ratio of loans to GDP in the years 1981-1997. 
Fourth, we verified if the negative link between government debt and private credit 
survives after controlling for the importance of the State in the ownership of banks. The test 
consists of two regressions and makes use of statistics reported by La Porta et al (2002) for 
the years 1970 and 1995.
8 In the first test, a term capturing State ownership of banks is 
included as a determinant of private credit in an OLS equation running over a cross-section of 
statistics for 1995.
9 In the second test, a time-invariant term on State ownership of banks, as 
observed in 1970, is included as a determinant of private credit in a set of models for panel 
data (random effect, OLS with time-dummies, pooled regression). All the regressions show 
that government debt maintains a negative and significant linkage with private credit, even 
controlling for State ownership of banks. The signs and significance of the parameters mimic 
those estimated in the analysis of the previous sections. The coefficient for State ownership of 
banks is mainly negative but not statistically significant and does not affect the sign and the 
significance of government debt. 
 
                                                           
8 Other statistics on State ownership of banks are provided by Barth, Caprio and Levine on the World Bank 
website,  but refer to data collected from 2001 onwards. 
9 Outcomes provided by OLS regressions exploiting a few, i.e. 17, observations referring to OECD countries, are 






Our results show that two driving factors lie behind the differences in the size of bank 
credit relative to GDP. 
First, government securities issues reduce the size of bank loans. A first explanation 
derives from a public finance perspective: financially repressed economies artificially 
increase their demand for State securities. Banks find that investing in government bonds is 
more attractive than granting credit to the economy. According to a second explanation, that 
does not exclude the first, a high public debt to GDP ratio may correspond to a large weight 
of the government and connected State-owned enterprises in the economy. In this setting, 
greater portions of credit are absorbed by governmental institutions and State-owned firms 
rather than by the private sector. While public debt has a negative impact on bank loans, other 
financial repression variables, such as inflation, its volatility and the reserve requirement do 
not show a robust significant effect on the ratio of loans to GDP. 
Second, as far as the law and finance theory is concerned, we find that the legal tradition 
of countries is a significant factor that promotes bank credit. The object of our paper is not the 
study of the financial systems overall but only of the size of bank loans. Therefore we do not 
identify the Anglo-Saxon legal origin as the crucial driving variable for the development of 
credit systems. According to our evidence, the most powerful legal origin is the German one; 
such a result is compatible with the idea that the German legal system is nearer to the 
common law tradition than previously stated (see Mayer and Sussman, 2001). 
Turning to the control variables, bank credit is often positively linked to stock market 
capitalization and per capita income, both contemporaneous and in lagged terms. Our 
empirical results are robust to the use of five-year average statistics or annual data, and to the 
introduction of firms’ securities issued in the model. Finally, we did not find a significant 
effect of past inflationary shocks, the ratio of branches to population, and trade openness on 






Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 -  Data Definition and Sources 
   
Sources of the statistics (key to abbreviations) 
BDL: Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt, and Levine (2003b). 
IFS: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
LLSV: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). 
WDI: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
BP: OECD, Bank Profitability.   
SC: OECD, Statistical Compendium. 
 
 
Dependent variable  
priv:   claims on private sector by deposit money banks as a percentage of 
GDP, BDL. 
 
Independent variables  
res2:   reserve requirement calculated as ratio of domestic currency holdings 
and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other 
governments, non financial public enterprises, the private sector, and 
other banking institutions, WDI. 
infl:     inflation rate calculated as annual growth rate of CPI, WDI. 
sdinfl:     standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year, WDI. 
gov_deb:    gross government debt as a percentage of GDP, SC. 
legor_ge:    German legal origin,   LLSV. 
legor _fr:    French legal origin,   LLSV. 
legor_uk:    Anglo-Saxon legal origin,  LLSV. 
legor_sc:     Scandinavian legal origin of country,  LLSV. 
creditor rights:   an index aggregating creditor rights, LLSV. A score of one is assigned 
when each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws 
and regulation: there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, for a 
debtor to file for reorganisation (i); secured creditors are able to seize 
their collateral once the reorganisation petition is approved (ii); secured 
creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 





administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganisation (iv). The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
trade:    sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured a 
percentage of GDP, WDI. 
infl_hist:   historical inflationary shocks, computed as averages of annual changes 
of CPI, over the period 1910-1950. Source: Mitchell (2003). 
GDPpc:   per capita GDP (PPP, current international $), WDI. 
stock:   stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, BDL. 
corpbonds:    securities other than shares as a percentage of GDP, issued by non 







Table 2  - Country list    
(18 High Income OECD Countries) 
      
       1  Australia 
       2  Austria 
       3  Belgium 
       4  Canada 
       5  Finland 
       6  France 
       7  Germany 
       8  Japan 
       9  Greece 
       10 Italy 
       11 Norway 
       12 Netherlands 
       13 Portugal 
       14 Spain 
       15 Sweden 
       16 Switzerland 
       17 United  Kingdom 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
priv infl sdinfl res2 gov_deb GDPpc stock trade corpbonds
mean 71 0.05 0.01 5.0 62 16,564 37 59 11
sd 30 0.05 0.01 8.1 29 5,043 31 29 9
min 26 -0.19 0.00 0.2 12 6,337 0 16 1
max 167 0.34 0.06 81.7 144 30,123 183 149 30
Annual data for the period 1981-1997. Priv is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); infl is the annual change in consumer prices; sdinfl is the standard deviation
of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the percapita GDP; stock is the stock




Table 4 - Correlation matrix 
priv infl sdinfl res2 gov_deb GDPpc stock trade corpbonds legor_ge legor_fr legor_uk legor_sc
priv 1
infl -0.31 1
sdinfl -0.15 0.61 1
res2 -0.26 0.49 0.34 1
gov_deb -0.36 -0.14 -0.12 0.02 1
GDPpc 0.42 -0.60 -0.49 -0.49 0.15 1
stock 0.50 -0.39 -0.27 -0.39 -0.03 0.59 1
trade -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15 0.36 0.02 -0.11 1
corpbonds 0.01 -0.12 0.08 -0.25 0.01 0.46 0.54 -0.42 1
legor_ge 0.68 -0.30 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 0.22 0.16 -0.12 0.67 1
legor_fr -0.24 0.33 0.19 0.45 0.45 -0.36 -0.40 0.31 -0.24 -0.43 1
legor_uk -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 -0.21 -0.08 0.16 0.42 -0.32 -0.15 -0.29 -0.43 1
legor_sc -0.27 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.27 0.05 -0.12 0.07 -0.27 -0.24 -0.36 -0.24 1
Annual data for the period 1981-1997. Priv is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); infl is the annual change in consumer prices; sdinfl is the standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is
the bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the percapita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP); trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
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Table 5 - Determinants of loans to GDP ratio in OECD countries: five-year average data 
Dependent variable: priv
1234567
FE FE FE First diff. RE RE+ OLS+
linfl -9.075 1.966 3.322 -0.430 -0.291 1.511 1.595
4.95 6.308 4.138 3.899 5.105 4.406 4.332
lnsdinfl -0.162 8.612 6.291 9.010* 2.151 2.556 -4.783
7.740 4.621 5.279 3.966 5.531 6.303 6.095
res2 -0.215 -0.170 -0.400 -0.188 -0.423* -0.680* -0.629
0.225 0.134 0.295 0.330 0.204 0.288 0.436
gov_deb -0.323* -0.278 -0.388* -0.364* -0.444** -0.482**





GDPpc_1 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
stock_1 0.206 0.283* 0.408* 0.555**







Constant 41.978 88.273** 108.132** 84.335** 73.606* 38.102
33.414 20.973 27.347 26.506 36.215 38.177
N 70 68 52 48 52 52 52
R-squared 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.43 0.85 0.86
Five-year averages for the period 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the
private sector (as a percentage of GDP); linfl is the logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is the logarithm of the standard
deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt
(as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP); legal dummies are
denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal significance at the 5%-level, and (**) at the
1% -level; FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect models. First diff. is the first difference estimator. (+) point estimates of legal
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Table 6 - Determinants of loans to GDP ratio in OECD countries 
(annual data) 
Dependent variable: priv
1 23456 7 8 9





linfl -5.022** -0.366 -0.537 0.223 -0.924 -1.334 -3.39 0.544 -1.992
1.229 1.298 1.302 0.500 1.261 1.256 2.125 1.63 3.108
 lnsdinfl -1.338 2.425 1.516 0.075 1.426 1.322 0.174 2.765 1.043
1.903 1.590 1.463 0.356 1.495 1.499 1.812 1.696 2.074
 res2 -0.879 -0.192 -0.141 -0.308 -0.106 -0.167 0.027 -0.05 -0.093
0.427 0.198 0.183 0.176 0.185 0.232 0.294 0.245 0.352
 gov_deb -0.357** -0.341** -0.127* -0.356** -0.411** -0.494** -0.473* -0.494**
0.113 0.097 0.057 0.091 0.064 0.055 0.234 0.058
GDPpc 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001
stock 0.146 0.013 0.164 0.41**
0.132 0.038 0.126 0.410
GDPpc_1 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
 stock_1 0.179 0.202 0.282* 0.441**
0.160 0.142 0.142 0.101
 legor_ge 44.600** 43.460** 44.649**
6.587 4.962 4.648
legor_fr 27.004** 31.524** 30.440**
4.655 3.167 3.798
 legor_sc -2.680 -0.253 -1.124
7.092 6.248 6.379
Constant 50.584** 60.966** 58.607** 58.305** 39.773** 31.982* 82.509* 40.029*
10.463 10.37 10.642 11.852 11.083 12.896 39.039 16.903
N 291 277 262 253 262 262 262 277 277
R-squared 0.15 0.39 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.80 0.82 0.40 0.83
Annual data for the period 1981-1997. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); linfl is the
logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is the logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly inflation observation for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves
to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of
GDP); legal dummies are denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal significance at the 5%-level, and (**) at the 1% -
level; FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect models. First diff. is the first difference estimator. (+) point estimates of legal dummies denote differential effects with
respect to leg_uk. Robust standard errors are below the estimated parameters. 
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Table 7 - Determinants of loans to GDP ratio in OECD countries  
(annual data, 1981-1989) 
Dependent variable: priv
123456 78 9





linfl -2.452 -1.811 -1.589 -0.419 -2.215 -1.096 -5.234 1.050 -4.506
1.331 1.081 1.767 0.845 1.808 1.722 2.759 1.96 2.823
 lnsdinfl -2.397 1.798 1.031 0.342 2.026 1.568 2.313 1.392 2.671
1.518 1.097 1.372 0.447 1.613 1.621 2.521 1.023 2.776
 res2 -2.040** -0.987** -1.150** -0.176 -0.346 -0.483** 0.462* -1.080** 0.702*
0.441 0.235 0.197 0.240 0.251 0.138 0.211 0.200 0.295
 gov_deb -0.600** -0.584* -0.333** -0.515** -0.545** -0.563** -0.726* -0.588**
0.206 0.208 0.099 0.125 0.106 0.065 0.315 0.071
GDPpc 0.002* 0.001** 0.003 0.002**
-0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
stock 0.234 0.230** 0.196 0.445**
0.162 0.078 0.149 0.097
 GDPpc_1 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
 stock_1 0.307 0.315* 0.38 0.503**
0.233 0.150 0.201 0.086
 legor_ge 48.541** 41.837** 41.321**
7.216 4.556 4.103
legor_fr 36.313** 28.543** 29.362**
9.600 5.585 5.550
 legor_sc 3.102 2.597 1.139
8.919 4.662 4.847
Constant 53.714** 70.456** 71.018** 67.248** 45.296** 39.440* 73.640* 20.878
7.165 6.607 7.432 14.308 13.064 17.936 32.096 21.871
N 151 137 122 116 122 122 122 137 137
R-squared 0.02 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.78 0.83 0.64 0.83
Annual data for the period 1981-1989. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); linfl is the
logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is the logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves
to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of
GDP); legal dummies are denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal significance at the 5%-level, and (**) at the 1% -
level; FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect models. First diff. is the first difference estimator. (+) point estimates of legal dummies denote differential effects with
respect to leg_uk. Robust standard errors are below the estimated parameters.
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Table 8 - Determinants of loans to GDP ratio in OECD countries 
(annual data, 1990-1997) 
Dependent variable: priv
123 4 567 8 9





linfl 0.793 -0.357 -0.201 0.192 -0.363 -0.737 -3.742 1.984 -3.250
1.522 0.685 0.683 0.633 0.744 0.729 2.600 1.361 3.761
 lnsdinfl -1.281 -1.930 -2.025* -0.645 -2.059* -1.770* -1.389 -0.972 -0.008
0.852 1.011 0.847 0.601 0.848 0.786 1.983 0.992 2.359
 res2 -0.841* -0.625* -0.536 -0.399 -0.583* -0.649** -0.818 -0.009 -0.985
0.344 0.281 0.313 0.261 0.280 0.241 0.423 0.293 0.512
 gov_deb -0.331** -0.361** -0.011 -0.380** -0.402** -0.441** -0.771** -0.415**
0.104 0.108 0.074 0.110 0.090 0.089 0.196 0.088
GDPpc 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000
-0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
stock -0.047 -0.018 -0.143 0.406**
0.07 0.047 0.08 0.094
 GDPpc_1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
 stock_1 -0.082 -0.038 0.011 0.409**
0.095 0.090 0.080 0.109
 legor_ge 38.313** 44.747** 47.603**
14.722 7.491 6.795
legor_fr 16.238 30.205** 30.301**
11.321 6.687 6.835
 legor_sc -15.349 -2.627 -1.754
13.295 10.758 11.554
Constant 77.067** 63.061** 59.464** 59.124** 49.997* 45.204 205.922** 50.107
6.103 16.988 16.779 16.062 21.397 23.539 52.897 31.736
N 140 140 140 119 140 140 140 140 140
R-squared 0.18 0.34 0.33 0.18 0.37 0.72 0.83 0.02 0.84
Annual data for the period 1990-1997. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentageo fG D P ) ;l i n f li st h e
logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is the logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid
reserves to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a
percentage of GDP); legal dummies are denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal significance at the 5%-level,
and (**) at the 1% -level; FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect models. First diff. is the first difference estimator. (+) point estimates of legal dummies denote
differential effects with respect to leg_uk. Robust standard errors are below the estimated parameters.
  
 
   
 
25
Table 9 - Determinants of loans to GDP ratio in OECD countries: do creditor 









 res2 -0.159 -0.137 -0.014
0.216 0.225 0.241
 gov_deb -0.379** -0.377** -0.318**
0.051 0.054 0.057
 GDPpc_1 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
0.000 0.000 0.000




 legor_ge 39.482** 35.683**
5.434 6.960
 legor_fr 25.679** 25.777**
5.034 5.936
 legor_sc -2.522 -1.893
5.543 6.690
 Constant 38.397** 28.446** 36.266**
6.900 7.444 7.779
N 251 251 251
R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.35
Annual data for the period 1981-1997. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system
to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); linfl is the logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is
the logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves to
bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP;
stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP); cr_rights is an index indicating creditor rights; legal
dummies are denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal
significance at the 5%-level, and (**) at the 1% -level; RE indicates random effect model. (+) point estimates of legal
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linfl -0.429 -0.932 -1.042 0.029 -1.707 -2.947* -4.045 1.270 -0.586
1.964 0.764 0.979 0.830 1.045 1.373 2.737 2.054 1.926
 lnsdinfl -0.678 -0.510 -0.427 -0.548 -0.494 -0.148 0.639 -0.729 1.002
0.950 0.903 0.799 0.629 0.872 1.013 1.360 1.158 1.906
 res2 -0.713** -0.473 -0.416 -0.448 -0.498* -0.673* -0.916* 0.293 -1.100*
0.130 0.233 0.248 0.301 0.247 0.331 0.417 0.403 0.423
 gov_deb -0.268* -0.293* 0.017 -0.344** -0.388** -0.348** -0.806** -0.331**
0.111 0.108 0.092 0.074 0.075 0.058 0.241 0.068
GDPpc 0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.001
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001
stock -0.058 -0.034 -0.119 0.367**
0.106 0.057 0.104 0.073
GDPpc_1 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
 stock_1 -0.067 -0.034 0.139 0.382**
0.144 0.122 0.107 0.077
corpbonds 1.616 1.236 1.179 1.357 0.428 0.065 -0.498 0.768 -0.279
0.886 0.811 0.762 0.385 0.611 0.545 0.309 0.794 0.309
 legor_ge 28.939* 30.084** 34.923**
13.511 5.129 4.777
legor_fr 18.632 15.569* 16.418*
13.368 5.935 6.726
 legor_sc 4.692 6.358 9.424
13.431 5.655 5.009
Constant 59.390** 48.745 46.906 57.695** 54.668 77.449** 306.783* 98.929**
12.475 23.185 22.990 21.604 31.132 24.378 101.521 29.776
N 115 115 115 100 115 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.24 0.67 0.78 0.07 0.80
Annual data for the period 1981-1997. Dependent variable (priv) is the amount of credit granted by the bank system to the private sector (as a percentageo fG D P ) ;l i n f li st h e
logarithm of the annual change in consumer prices; lnsdinfl is the logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly inflation observations for the year; res2 is the bank liquid reserves
to bank assets ratio; gov_deb is the gross government debt (as a percentage of GDP); GDPpc is the per capita GDP; stock is the stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of
GDP); corpbond is the stock of bonds issued by non financial corporations (as a percentage of GDP): legal dummies are denoted by the prefix leg_; the suffix (_1) denotes the
lagged term of variables; (*) indicates marginal significance at the 5%-level, and (**) at the 1% -level; FE and RE indicate fixed effect and random effect models. First diff. is
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